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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of online dispute resolution (ODR) is not new.' But,
with the advent of Web 3.0, the distributed web that facilitates
pseudonymous and cross-border transactions via blockchain's distributed
ledger technology, 2 the idea of, and pressing need for, appropriate
t Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor; Director of the UNH Franklin
Pierce School of Law Blockchain, Cryptocurrency and Law Certificate Program; Chair,
Intellectual Property and Technology Online Programs. UNH Franklin Pierce School of
Law.
1. In the Web 2.0 iteration of the Internet, the term online "refer[red] to the use of
the Internet or related communications technologies (such as email, videoconferencing,
or interaction via a website or chatroom) as the primary method of communication during
a transaction or related dispute resolution proceeding." Of course, the term applies with
equal force in the Web 3.0 environment that uses existing technologies-some decades
old (i.e., peer-to-peer technology, public/private key cryptography and digital
signatures-in a novel fashion via the Internet. Recommended Best Practices for Online
Dispute Resolution, ABA TASK FORCE ON ECOMMERCE AND ADR,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/documents/BestPractices
Final102802.pdf (last visited June 28, 2019) (recommending best practices for online
dispute resolution service providers).
2. This paper presumes some baseline knowledge of blockchain and distributed
ledger technology. Essentially, blockchain is a novel database structure invented in 2008
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dispute resolution models for blockchain-based disputes to support this
novel system of distributed consensus and trust of which blockchain
proponents boast, is a primary concern in rapid development. 3
The common goal of each project is to utilize smart contracts to
facilitate "superior, quicker[,] and less expensive proceedings by
eliminating so many of the tedious and protracted trappings of traditional
arbitral proceedings, such as the sending and receiving of documents via
courier.",4 Despite myriad approaches, all emerging blockchain-based
dispute resolution services (BDR solutions) generally seek to bridge the
divide between automated performance mechanisms, like smart
contracts, and the human judgment traditionally required to settle legal
disputes.5
and launched in 2009 by a pseudonymous person, group, or entity Satoshi Nakamoto.
What is Blockchain Technology? A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners, BLOCKGEEKS
(Mar. 1, 2019), https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-blockchain-technology/.
Blockchains-there is not just one-function much like an excel spreadsheet and without
any centralized server or entity to maintain a single master version of the current state of
the ledger at any single point in time. Id. Rather than a centralized server or trusted
intermediary, the ledger is maintained and validated by a peer-to-peer network of
computers. Id. Cryptocurrency-specifically Bitcoin-was the first use case for Satoshi's
blockchain, much in the same way electronic mail (e-mail) was the first application for
Internet technology. See id However, there are many actual and proposed uses for this
nascent technology. See id And at the time of publication, hundreds of blockchains and
at least 1,800 different cryptocurrencies exist. See COINMARKETCAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited May 6, 2019). For more substantive coverage,
see Tonya M. Evans, Cryptokitties, Cryptography and Copyright, AIPLA Q.J.
(forthcoming 2019).
3. An ever-growing list of ODR projects includes: Kleros (kleros.io), JUR (jur.io),
Juris (jurisproject.io), Aragon (aragon.org/network), Delphi (delphi.systems), Rhubarb
(rhucoin.com), SAMBA (http://www.miamiblockchaingroup.com/), Jury Online
(jury.online), and OpenCourt (https://media.consensys.net/opencourt-legally-enforceable-
blockchain-based-arbitration-3d7147dbb56f).
4. Caroline Simson, Arbitration Uniquely Situated to Benefit from Blockchain,







5. See, e.g., Adam J. Kerpelman, Introducing the Juris Protocol: Human-Powered




ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL RULES
How our existing legal frameworks must develop to ensure that
smart contracts 6 facilitate, rather than frustrate, the parties' intent is a
critically important question to ask as the blockchain stack's
infrastructure and application layers are being built and, ultimately,
scaled. Indeed, interest is high in the race to create alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms to resolve disputes arising from blockchain-based
commercial transactions that, due to the transnational, borderless,




A contract is a legal relationship defined as an agreement that creates
mutually enforceable obligations. 8 Every contract is an agreement, but
not every agreement is a contract, as a matter of law. 9 To be legally
enforceable, a contract requires mutual assent of the parties as expressed
by: an offer and an acceptance of the offer, adequate consideration, legal
capacity to enter into the contract, and legal subject matter.' 0
A "smart contract," conceived by Nick Szabo," is best understood as
programmable code that exists within a blockchain protocol. 12 The term
smart contract is a misnomer given that these pieces of code are neither
"smart" nor a "contract" in the common understanding of both words. 13
The term vexes both lawyer and technologist alike as a term that sparks
unnecessary controversy and causes far more confusion than is justified
given the acutal mundane and routinized functions at issue. 14 In fact, in a
2019 tweet, Ethereum Founder Vitalik Buterin responded to a Twitter
conversation about the proprietary of the term and role of "crypto law" in
6. See Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts Glossary, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO INSTITUTE
(1995), https://nakamotoinstitute.org/smart-contracts-glossary/
[https:/archive.fo/OaJkO] (providing the original authoritative glossary of smart contract
terms).
7. See Simson, supra note 4.




11. See generally Stefan Stankovic, Who is Nick Szabo, The Mysterious Blockchain
Titan, UNBLOCK (July 13, 2018), https://unblock.net/nick-szabo/.
12. See Szabo, supra note 6.
13. Judah A. Druck, "Smart Contracts "Are Neither Smart nor Contracts. Discuss.,
37 No. 10 BANKING & FiN. SERVS. POL'Y REP. 5 (2018).
14. Id. at 7.
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the blockchain ecosystem: "To be clear, at this point I quite regret
adopting the term 'smart contracts.' I should have called them something
more boring and technical, perhaps something like 'persistent scripts."'
1 5
The pushback against, and even the disdain for, traditional notions of
law and legal intermediaries and the role of law and legalese in an
ecosystem born out of the decidedly Libertarian cypherpunk movement
should not be underestimated. 16 But as the ecosystem at large comes to
terms with the reality that blockchains exist within an existing and
enduring labyrinth of local, national, and international legal systems, an
increasing number of blockchain originalists and other stakeholders are
embracing the reality that blockchain does not exist in a cypherpunk
vacuum.
17
The Ethereum Network was the first blockchain built specifically to
accommodate programmable code-in the same way a computer's
operating system runs various applications.18 Szabo describes it more
specifically as, "[a] set of promises including protocols, within which the
parties perform on the other promises."' 19 The protocols, explains Szabo,
are usually implemented via software programs on a decentralized
network of computers or "other forms of digital electronics., 20 Because
promises, once triggered by some action on-chain, are performed without
human interaction or trusted third party intermediaries, Szabo deemed
smart contracts to be "smarter" than their paper-based antecedents.2 '
15. Vitalik Buterin (@VitalikButerin), TWITTER (Oct. 13, 2018, 10:21 AM),
https://twitter.comNVitalikButerin/status/1 051160932699770882.
16. See generally Eric Hughes, A Cypherpunk's Manifesto, ACTIVISM.NET (Mar. 9,
1993), https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html.
17. See Simon Chandler, Smart Contracts Are No Problem for the World's Legal
Systems, So Long as They Behave Like Legal Contracts, COINTELEGRAPH (Feb. 8, 2019),
https://cointelegraph. com/news/smart-contracts-are-no-problem-for-the-worlds-legal-
systems-so-long-as-they-behave-like-legal-contracts.
18. See generally Vitalik Buterin, A Next Generation Smart Contract &
Decentralized Application Platform, GITHUB (2013),
https://github.com/ethereufn/wiki/wiki/White-Paper; Taylor Gerring, Cut and Try;
Building a Dream, ETHEREUM BLOG (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/02/09/cut-and-try-building-a-dream/; History of
Ethereum, ETHEREUM HOMESTEAD (2016),
http://ethdocs.org/en/latest/introduction/history-of-ethereum.html; Gavin Wood,
Ethereum: A Secure Decentralised Generalised Transaction Ledger (EIP-150 Revision),
GAVWOOD.COM, https://gavwood.com/paper.pdf (last visited May 6, 2019).
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Szabo's goal for smart contracts focused primarily on increased
security within society.22 He posited that formalizing and securing
relationships, especially through contract, "provide[s] the blueprint for
ideal security."2 Further, he asserted that "contractual clauses (such as
collateral, bonding, delineation of property rights, etc.) can be embedded
in ... hardware and software ... to make breach of contract expensive
(if desired, sometimes prohibitively so) for the breacher. ' '24 Szabo
intended for smart contracts to be most commonly utilized in the
performance of "financial contracts, liens, and other kinds of security,
transfer of ownership, performance of online services, and supply chain
workflow." 25 He also sought to replace traditional contracts with self-
executable agreements based on "code as law," also referred to as lex
cryptographica.26 I argue that coding these agreements to precisely
reflect and perform the parties' intent is essential to create an enforceable
legal agreement.
Innovation and societal progress historically outpace the laws that
are eventually crafted to protect users, consumers, and society from such
technological advances.2 7 And those advances seem to be occurring at an
increasingly rapid clip.2 8 For example, little more than a decade ago,
22. Id.; see also Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public
Networks, FIRST MONDAY
(Sept. 1, 1997), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fin/article/view/548/469.
23. Szabo, supra note 6.
24. Id. This goal makes sense for rule of law application, but it does not fare as well
with equitable considerations.
25. Nick Szabo, A Formal Language for Analyzing Contracts, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO
INSTITUTE (2002),
https://nakamotoinstitute.org/contract-language/ [https://archive.fo/QfvwL].
26. See id. at 193-204 (discussing the potential applications-and limitations- of
code as law); PRIvAVERA DE FILiPpi & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW 73-
74 (2018).
27. See Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can't Keep Pace with Technology, MIT
TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-
ethics-cant-keep-pace-with-technology/; John Shinal, When Technology and Society
Outpace the Law, USA TODAY (Mar. 1, 2016, 4:41 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/shinalU2016/03/01/when-technology-and-
society-outpace-law/81167076/.
28. Paul Scharre, Making Sense of Rapid Technological Change, CTR. FOR A NEW
AM. SEC. (July 19, 2017), https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/making-sense-
of-rapid-technological-change ("In the span of a few short years, the internet, mobile
devices, and social media have transformed how we communicate and get information
about the world."); see also John 0. McGinnis, Laws for Learning in an Age of
Acceleration, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 305, 310-16 (2011).
2019]
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smart phones (these powerful, handheld mini-computers) did not exist.29
As of 2015, nearly two-thirds of Americans owned a smartphone. 30 The
overwhelming majority of smartphone owners use these devices as a key
entry point to the online world.31 The first personal computer arrived just
forty years before the digital native, smartphone-dependent American
society that exists today. 32 Early in the 1990s, the commercial Internet-
a means of connecting users (other than the government or academics) to
words and images-was just taking root.33 If the development of the
world wide web, Internet, and digital technology moved from the late
1950s through the early twenty-first century at "the speed of sound,"
development of blockchain and distributed ledger technology is on pace
to move at the speed of light.34 In addition to the pace of blockchain
infrastructure development, the transnational reach and impact of the
technology on the global economy across varied and various industries-
finance, healthcare, supply chains, entertainment, and other IP-intensive
industries-is astounding. 3
29. See Owen Andrew, The History and Evolution of the Smartphone: 1992-2018,
TEXT REQUEST (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.textrequest.com/blog/history-evolution-
smartphone/.
30. Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEw RES. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015),
https://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/. This number has
doubled since 2011, when just 34% of Americans owned a smartphone. Id.
31. Id
32. Scharre, supra note 28. Mark Prensky coined the term "digital native" to describe
the generation of children, born around 1980, who grew up in the digital age. Will
Kenton, Digital Native, INVESTOPEDIA
(May 24, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/digital-native.asp. As Kenton
further explains:
The idea of "digital native" came from an article explaining why today's
teachers are having trouble teaching students. Prensky argues that young people
today are speaking a digital language whereas teachers are speaking an old
accented language (their accent being their reluctance to adopt new
technology). He calls for a change in the way children are taught so that they
may learn in a "language" they understand.
Id.
33. See generally DANIEL B. GARRIE, PLUGGED IN: GUIDEBOOK TO SOFTWARE AND THE
LAw § 3.2 (2018 ed. 2018); Tristan Fitzpatrick, A Brief History of the Internet, Sci. NODE
(Feb. 9, 2017), https://sciencenode.org/feature/a-brief-history-of-the-internet-.php;
History.corn Editors, The Invention of the Internet, HIST. (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.history.com/topics/inventions/invention-of-the-internet.
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Core and application layer developers, technologists, and dogged
entrepreneurs continue to build the blockchain infrastructure; the
technological stack, regulators, lawmakers, and law enforcement across
the globe attempt to make sense of it all-both within the confines of
existing rules and regulations and also potential sui generis ones. 36 In
this light, we see that although regulatory challenges in the midst of
technological disruption is not new, this time it somehow feels
different-more challenging and more important than ever.37
A fundamental question the ecosystem must ask at every step, and an
essential issue to resolve, is who (or what entity) creates the rules and
regulations that govern the development, impact, and effects of this
transnational, disruptive technology? 38 Further, what rules apply when a
regulated industry is disrupted? Are all rules abandoned? Is some hybrid
rule developed? Do we institute and implement a sui generis approach?
Whatever the answer, the ecosystem stakeholders must work as a
multifaceted, multidisciplinary community to resolve these questions.
B. Existing International Dispute Resolution Frameworks
Web 2.0-the Internet of information-"was not and is not governed
by the United Nations (UN), the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU)," or other international institutions, but rather by numerous multi-
stakeholder networks, "involving the private sector, civil society,
government, academia, and others."' 39 Any cross-border dispute
resolution model must similarly embrace such a multifaceted,
multidisciplinary approach. 40 It must also include existing multinational
legal frameworks, set forth by international bodies and implemented by
national stakeholders.41
Uniform laws, especially those promulgated by international bodies
of member nations, avoid the morass of disagreements over which
36. DE FrawPi & WRIGHT, supra note 26, at 47-49.
37. TAPSCOTT, supra note 34, at 5 ("There has never been a more important or
challenging time to be a regulator.").
3 8. What it Takes to Build Your Blockchain, PWC GLOBAL,
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/blockchain/blockchain-in-business/build-an-
ecosystem.html (last visited May 6, 2019).
39. TA, scoTr, supra note 34, at 11.
40. Koji Takahashi, Implications of the Blockchain Technology for the UNCITRAL
Works, UNCITRAL 21,
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Papers for Programme/30-TAKAHASHI-





jurisdiction's existing legal system is superior.42 On ratification of a
treaty or convention, member nations are then charged with the task of
implementation-either by reconciling the ratified model law within its
existing legal framework or by adopting the model law as a sui generis
framework. 43
Existing international frameworks include conventions, treaties, and
institutions promulgated by the United Nations. 44 The UN created the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
the core international trade law system of the UN, that seeks to
modernize and to harmonize international business rules.45
Prudent BDR platforms and services will leverage the wide reach of
international arbitration and dispute resolution guidance, similar to the
guidelines created by the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, to serve as the legal
framework to provide certainty, predictability, and uniformity in the
resulting decisions made via such platforms and services.46 UNCITRAL
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. The United Nations, founded by charter in 1945, seeks to "take action on the
issues confronting humanity in the 21st century, such as peace and security, climate
change, sustainable development, human rights, disarmament, terrorism, humanitarian
and health emergencies, gender equality, governance, food production, and more."
Overview, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un. org/en/sections/about-
un!overview/index.html (last visited May 6, 2019).
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a cent[er] for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends.
U.N. Charter art. I, 1-4.
45. About UNCITRAL, UNITED NATIONS COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L.,
https://uncitral.un.org/about (last visited May 6, 2019).
46. lyke Aru, A Decentralized Dispute Resolution Platform Emerges on the
Blockchain, COINTELEGRAPH, https://cointelegraph.com/news/a-decentralized-dispute-
resolution-platform-emerges-on-the-blockchain (last visited May 6, 2019). As of this
date, 159 nations are signatories to this Convention. Status: Convention on the
[Vol. 65:1
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involves numerous other initiatives that may prove illustrative for
different aspects of blockchain-based disputes. These include the
Model Law on Electronic Commerce,48 the Model Law on Electronic
Signatures,49 the Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications
in International Contracts,50 the Model Law on Electronic Transferable
Records, 51 the Rotterdam Rules, 52 and the Model Law on Secured
Transactions. 53 Koji Takahashi provides thorough and thought-provoking
scholarship on the implications these various UNCITRAL works have on
blockchain technology.54  Flexible rules to evaluate and settle
international disputes is important.5 5 But, without a corresponding
enforcement mechanism, such rules would be rendered meaningless.56
C. UNCITRAL
Although distributed ledger technology did not exist when
UNCITRAL first came into existence, UNCITRAL's reach is
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958),
UNICTRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention-status.html
(last visited May 6, 2019).
47. See About UNCITRAL, supra note 45.
48. Model Law on Electronic Commerce, UNCITRAL,
https://uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/electronic-commerce/1996Model.html (last
visited May 6, 2019).
49. Model Law on Electronic Signatures, UNCITRAL,
https://uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/electronic-commerce/200 1 Model-signature
s.html (last visited May 6, 2019).
50. See generally United Nations Convention on the use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts, U.N. Doc. No. A/60/21, Annex, Nov. 23,
2005.
51. Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records, UNCITRAL,
https://uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/electroniccommerce/2017Model.html (last
visited May 6, 2019).
52. The Rotterdam Rules, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.,
https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/TTL/Legal/Rotterdam-Rules.aspx (last visited May 6,
2019).
53. Model Law on Secured Transactions, UNCITRAL,
https://uncitral.org/en/uncitraltexts/security/2016Model_Secured.html (last visited May
6,2019).
54. See generally Takahashi, supra note 40. In this paper, Takahashi focuses on a
different aspect of blockchain's impact on UNCITRAL works. See generally id First, he
examines what issues presented by blockchain can be resolved by the model laws
mentioned in the body of this paper. Id. Second, he examines whether it is possible to
obtain restitution for cryptocurrencies-specifically tokens-by means of proprietary
claims. Id.




technologically agnostic in its application to electronic commerce.57
Therefore, blockchain-based cross-border transactions are well within the
reach of UNCITRAL's laws, rules, regulations, and enforcement
mechanisms.18 In the 2010 Report of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, the Commission detailed, among other things,
the finalized and adopted revised version of the UNCITRAL arbitration
rules.59
The rules are divided into four sections: introductory rules,
composition of the arbitral tribunal, arbitral proceedings, and the
award.60 The rules provide a comprehensive set of procedural rules upon
which parties may agree for any controversy arising out of their
commercial agreement that necessitates a formal resolution. 61 The rules
are widely-used in both ad hoc arbitrations and administered
arbitrations. 62 They cover all aspects of the arbitral process and provide a
model arbitration clause as well as other important dispute resolution
frameworks and guidance.63
57. Id. at 2-3 ("Th[is] principle helps ensure that the law is able to accommodate
future technological developments.").
58. Id.
59. Rep. of United Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade L., at 4-12, U.N. Doc. A/65/17
(2010).
60. Id.
61. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/2010 Arbitration rules.html
(last visited May 6, 2019).
62. Id.
63. Id. For example, in addition to the rules mentioned in the body of the text, the
rules cover other parts of the arbitration process including:
[S]etting out procedural rules regarding the appointment of arbitrators and the
conduct of arbitral proceedings, and establishing rules in relation to the form,
effect and interpretation of the award. At present, there exist three different
versions of the Arbitration Rules: (i) the 1976 version; (ii) the 2010 revised
version; and (iii) the 2013 version.
[Vol. 65:1
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D. New York Convention64
The two essential functions of the New York Convention are: (1) for
contracting parties (Contracting States or States) to recognize and
enforce foreign arbitral awards of other States; and (2) for courts of
Contracting States to refer the parties to arbitration at the request of one
of the parties (unless the arbitration agreement is invalid).65 The court
decisions interpreting and applying the New York Convention have been
published in the Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration since its first
volume was published in 1976.66 Decisions are indexed by description,
topic, and country.67 These decisions could provide essential data and
decisional metrics for recognized topics and the commitment of
64. In Brief N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/in+brief
(last visited June 18, 2019). The following describes one action contemplated by the New
York Arbitration Cofivention:
The first action is the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,
i.e., arbitral awards made in the territory of another (Contracting) State. This
field of application is defined in Article I. The general obligation for the
Contracting States to recognize such awards as binding and to enforce them in
accordance with their rules of procedure is laid down in Article III. A party
seeking enforcement of a foreign award needs to supply to the court (a) the
arbitral award and (b) the arbitration agreement (Article IV). The party against
whom enforcement is sought can object to the enforcement by submitting proof
of one of the grounds for refusal of enforcement which are limitatively [sic]
listed in Article V(1). The court may on its own motion refuse enforcement for
reasons of public policy as provided in Article V(2). If the award is subject to
an action for setting aside in the country in which, or under the law of which, it
is made ("the country of origin"), the foreign court before which enforcement
of the award is sought may adjourn its decision on enforcement (Article VI).
Finally, if a party seeking enforcement prefers to base its request for
enforcement on the court's domestic law on enforcement of foreign awards or
bilateral or other multilateral treaties in force in the country where it seeks
enforcement, it is allowed to do so by virtue of the so-called more-favourable-
right provision of Article VII(l).
Id.
65. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award, U.N.
Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, art. II (1958),
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/l1165/web/files/original/1/5/15432.pdf.
66. Court Decisions, N. Y. ARB. CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/court+decisions (last visited May 6, 2019). To date,
more than 1,700 court decisions have been published. Id. The decisions are labeled with a
"unique number in the Yearbook (e.g., 'US 503'). The reasoning of each decision is
indexed by subject matters ('Topics', e.g., ' 105') and paragraph number (e.g., 'US 503
(sub 4)'). Those data appear in the 'chapeau' of each court decision as reported in the
Yearbook and online at www.kluwerarbitration.com." Id.
67. See Court Decisions, supra note 66.
2019]
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Contracting States to recognize and enforce decisions of other States.68
To date, there are 159 parties to the New York Convention.69
E. BDR Mechanics
As noted above, smart contracts are pieces of software code that run
on top of a blockchain protocol.7 ° Parties program smart contracts to
autonomously execute or perform an obligation under predefined
conditions (e.g., "if X, then y,,).71 When the "if' occurs successfully, the
"then" of the smart contract is triggered to complete the output and write
72the results to the relevant blockchain that supports the smart contract.
Smart contract code facilitates the performance of an agreement
between the parties.73 This is particularly useful in the blockchain space,
where parties are often pseudonymous actors identified only by public
key address.74 An example will help bring this nebulous concept into
focus. Two parties, Alice, the buyer, living in the United States and Bob,
the seller, living in Ghana, agree that Bob will create a website for Alice
to go live on a specified date for a specified series of payments (one-third
on contract, one-third on soft launch, one-third on final launch). Alice
informs Bob that the website must be completed, tested, and launched
before the grand opening of her business, and Bob agrees to those "time-
is-of-the-essence-terms." Bob agrees to receive payment in
cryptocurrency.
If a breach occurs, what law will apply to settle the controversy and
make the parties whole (in the parlance of American contract law), where
two parties live under vastly different legal regimes of two different
countries? If the parties agree at the outset to subject their mutual
68. Id.
69. Contracting States, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/list+of+contracting+states (last visited May 6, 2019)
(noting that these parties include 156 of the 193 United Nations member-States plus the
Cook Islands, the Holy See, and the State of Palestine and that the United States has been
a contracting member since September 30, 1970).
70. See Szabo, supra note 6; see also Smart Contracts, BLOCKCHAIINHUB,
https://blockchainhub.net/smart-contracts (last visited May 6, 2019).
71. Joel Comm, How Smart Contracts Could Change The Way You Do Business,
FORBES (May 16, 2018),
https://www. forbes.com/sites/forbescoachescouncil/2018/05/16/how-smart-contracts-
could-change-the-way-you-do-business/# 10d79c 171288. Recall the vending machine
example.
72. Id.
73. See Smart Contracts, supra note 70.
74. For a discussion on asymmetric-key encryption, also referred to as public-key
encryption, see generally Jeff Tyson, How Encryption Works, HOwSTUFFWORKS (Apr. 6,
2001), https://computer.howstuffworks.com/encryption3.htm.
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obligations and contractual terms to smart contracts (for example, to
automate payment) and to BDR (to retain the ability to pause automated
performance, in case of a controversy, and apply a pre-defmed set of
rules as interpreted and applied by a BDR arbitrator or arbitral panel),
they can opt into a private dispute resolution that is faster, far less
expensive, borderless, and more efficient than traditional State-based
dispute resolution in either country.75 Additionally, arbitral outcomes
would be recorded to a blockchain to preserve transactional data on-
chain and related information, like authenticated documents.76 Results
would also be recorded off-chain, by means of Inter Planetary File
Storage (IPFS) or a similar decentralized file storage system.77
F. Risks of Blockchain ODR
I detailed above a range of potential benefits of a fully-functioning
BDR solution. However, exploration of the possibilities of a
decentralized dispute resolution would be wholly inadequate and
incomplete without identifying the risks as well. In Decentralized Justice
in the Era of Blockchain, Dr. James Metzger explored some of the
challenges of a specific blockchain-based dispute resolution platform,
Kleros, which may prove illustrative for broader concerns in
decentralized dispute resolution. 78 Those challenges include: (1)
technological and educational barriers to participation; (2)
cryptocurrency volatility affecting, in the case of Kleros, the price of
Ether and the Kleros platform token values; 79 (3) jury pool compositions;
(4) applicable laws; and (5) cryptoeconomic incentives.80
75. Aru, supra note 46.
76. See Julius Arie Hermanto, On-Chain and Off-Chain Transaction Settlement in
Cryptocurrency Exchange-New Advanced Technology behind Blockchain.io as A New
Generation of Cryptocurrency Exchange, MEDIUM (July 27, 2018),
https://medium.com/@juliostore83/on-chain-and-off-chain-transaction-settlement-in-
cryptocurrency-exchange-new-advanced-technology-f50085179af8.
77. For an explanation of IPFS, see generally About, IPFS, https://ipfs.io/#why (last
visited May 6, 2019); Juan Benet, IPFS - Content Addressed, Versioned, P2P File System
(DRAFT 3),
IFPS,
https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmR7GSQM93Cx5eAg6a6yRzNdel FQv7uL6X 1 o4k7zrJa3LX/ipfs.dr
aft3.pdf (last visited May 6, 2019).
78. James Metzger, Decentralized Justice in the Era of Blockchain, 5 INT'L J. OF
ONLINE Disp. RESOL. 69 (2018).
79. The PNK token is the platform token used in Kleros, a decentralized application
(dApp) that runs on the Ethereum Network. See Kleros, CoNMARKETCAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/kleros/ (last visited May 6, 2019).
80. Metzger, supra note 78, at 69-81.
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1. Technological and Educational Barriers
An initial fundamental challenge that impacts all BDR solutions is
the need to obtain the native currency of the respective blockchain (for
example, ETH for Ethereum) in order to exchange that native coin for
the BDR's tokens (for example, PNK for Kleros). 8' This process of on-
boarding from fiat currency to cryptocurrency is incredibly time-
consuming and challenging from the average user's point of view.82 This
reality dramatically shrinks the available pool of participants to submit
controversies to BDR services as well as the pool of available arbitrators
(called jurors in the Kleros example).83
Additionally, the technological tools needed to on-board involve, in
the case of Kleros or any dApp that runs on Ethereum, a Web3-enabled
browser plug-in (such as MetaMask 84) as a layer between centralized
web-browser tools (for example, Google Chrome or Mozilla Firefox) and
blockchains.85 These technological hurdles exist before one can even
register to serve as a juror in Kleros. 86 Again, many BDR platforms have
similar on-boarding challenges.87
2. Cryptocurrency Volatility Affecting Price
A related concern to Part H(F)(l), immediately above, 88 is the
volatility of the cryptocurrency market for both native coins and ERC-20
tokens like PNK that often track the ups and downs of Bitcoin, the
81. Hugo Renaudin, Shortfalls of Decentralized Exchanges, MEDIUM (Jan. 15, 2018),
https://medium.com/lgogroup/shortfalls-of-decentralized-exchanges-8f2bf7d2bd5O.
82. Swati Goyal, The Difference Between Fiat Money and Cryptocurrencies, YAHOO
FIN. (Aug. 9, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/difference-between-fiat-money-
cryptocurrencies- 132027811 .html; see generally Sam Stone, Fiat Gateway: Why it's a
key element for security tokens, MEDIUM (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://medium.com/swarmfund/fiat-gateway-75b5fbd2d05b.
83. Obtaining cryptocurrency is somewhat analogous to exchanging foreign currency,
which is presumably a more common endeavor in the twenty-first century. But, says Dr.
Metzger, "even that comparison may suggest a significant enough barrier to entry for
many." Metzger, supra note 78, at 76.
84. See METAMASK, https://metamask.io/ (last visited May 6, 2019).
85. See id.
86. See Federico Ast and Cl6ment Lesaege, Kleros: Frequently Asked Questions
about Peer-to-Peer Justice: What do I need to set up before the sale?, MEDIUM (Oct. 2,
2017), https://medium.com/kleros/kleros-frequently-asked-questions-about-peer-to-peer-
justice-5a921 cb76abe
87. See supra note 84.
88. See supra Part II.F.1.
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dominant coin in terms of market cap.89 Questions exist about how token
value changes juror fidelity to meting out justice in the form of optimal
arbitral results. 90 High volume also impacts cryptocurrency and gas
prices on platforms like Ethereum.91 An example of how high volume
can drastically increase the cost of Ethereum transactions required to
participate in Kleros is best illustrated by the impact Cryptokitties had on
the Ethereum network at the height of that dApp's popularity at the end
of 2017.92 Despite any benefits of BDR solutions, these new variables in
the dispute resolution arena need careful attention to ensure platforms are
built to be impervious to such volatility. This volatility would inject
uncertainty into a system where certainty and trustworthiness are of
critical importance.
3. Jury Pool Composition
Due to the high technological and educational barriers to entry and
price volatility, jury pool composition is a substantial concern.93
Although some controversies might be single-issue, garden-variety ones,
it is far more likely that parties who. submit to BDR have complex issues
requiring a certain level of education and sophistication of both the legal




What laws apply is an ever-present concern. Ensuring arbitrators use
the same set of rules and metrics to evaluate and settle disputes is
paramount to ensuring predictable and optimal results. It is for this
89. See Bitcoin, CoINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/kleros/ (last
visited May 6, 2019); see also Chrisjan Pauw, How Cryptocurrency Prices Work,
Explained, CourNELEGRAPH (July 24, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/explained/how-
cryptocurrency-prices-work-explained.
90. See William George, Why Kleros Needs a Native Token?, MEDfUM (June 7,
2018), https://medium.com/kleros/why-kleros-needs-a-native-token-5c6c6e39cdfe.
91. See generally What is Gas?,
MYETIERWALLET, https://kb.myetherwallet.com/gas/what-is-gas-ethereum.html (last
visited May 6, 2019).
92. See Evans, supra note 2, at 10-11; see also Michael Taggart, Itty Bitty Kitties are
Killing Ethereum, MEDIUM (Dec. 7, 2017), https://medium.com/@michaelx777/little-
bitty-kitties-are-killing-ethereum-al 253b 18b501.
93. See Metzger, supra note 78, at 69-81.
94. See Oliver Marquais, Introduction to Programmable Contracts: A Dispute





reason, I advocate that BDRs adopt international model laws, rules, and
enforcement mechanisms to create a reliable and predictable arbitral
platform.
5. Cryptoeconomics, Incentives and Decentralized Justice
The success of BDR solutions is necessarily premised on "a
combination of cryptoeconomics principles and game theory [to] provide
necessary incentives to keep jurors honest, [and therefore] administer[]
fairness of decision-making., 95 Honesty is inextricably linked to the
desire of rational actors to protect their token balance. 96 Sufficient
application governance must exist to ensure the stability, validity, and
security of the platform. Further, that platform must reside on an equally
stable, valid, and secure blockchain.
HI. CONCLUSION
Rather than disrupting dispute resolution, I imagine that BDR
solutions will augment and improve upon existing ODR systems.
Additionally, I assert that the most effective means of achieving an
optimal result is to utilize existing international rules and regulations
promulgated by the United Nations as the legal infrastructure for BDR
solutions.
95. Metzger, supra note 78, at 81.
96. See James Chen, Rational Choice Theory, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rational-choice-theory.asp.
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